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1. Introduction
1 The relationship  between science  and common sense  has  traditionally  been a  major
concern in the history of pragmatist philosophy. Starting from Dewey, pragmatists have
devoted great deal of attention to the ways in which science and common sense can
interact, their proposal being that of defusing the possible elements of conflict between
what they conceived as two attitudes towards the world. In the fourth chapter of his Logic:
Theory of Inquiry, Dewey identified common sense with those situations in which “human
beings are directly involved” (common sense world), as well as with the “inquiries that
take place in making the required adjustments in behavior” (common sense inquiries)
(Dewey 1938: 66). Common sense inquiries, he argued, differ from scientific ones in that
the former are “concerned with qualitative matter and operations,” while the meanings
and significances that are used in the latter are determined “on the ground of their
systematic relations of coherence and consistency with one another,” that is, they are
intra-theoretically  defined (Dewey 1938:  71).  In  doing so,  Dewey did  not  conceive  of
science  and  common  sense  as  opposites,  but  rather  as  two  different  and  equally
legitimate ways of framing and dealing with ultimately practical problems. Consequently,
he completely eschewed the widespread idea of the intrinsic conflict between science and
common sense, thus making room for a plurality of approaches to the world.
2 The goal of our paper is to revisit and refresh such a pragmatist, pluralist insight. Our
analysis will follow two distinct, yet strictly interrelated paths. On the one hand, it will
take into account  the structure of  two normative spaces  –  one in the framework of
common sense,  the  other  in  the  framework of  science  –  in  order  to  highlight  their
different principles of constitution of objectivity. By adapting Wilfrid Sellars’ terms, we
will call these two normative spaces, respectively, the manifest image and the scientific
image, and we will hold that the difference in their structures can be expressed in terms
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of the different kinds of inferences that the two normative spaces allow us to make.1 Such
an approach, which may be called structural, emphasizes the differences between science
and  common  sense  rather  than  their  continuity.  It  provides  us  with  a  picture that
somehow crystallizes into a static ‘essence’ (the structure) the outcome of a long and
complex process of conceptual refinement. Since we believe inferences can be analyzed as
sets  of  sentences  –  that  is,  inferences  can be  treated as  relations  between linguistic
sentences  without  loss  of  explanatory import  –  the investigation into the normative
structures of common sense and science can be profitably conceived of as an attempt to
reconstruct and clarify the different languages – or vocabularies, in Rortyian terms – of
the manifest and the scientific image. 
3 On the other hand, our analysis will also focus on the concrete practices that underlie the
languages of science and common sense, and make it possible for us to use them properly.
We take concepts to be determined by the ways in which they are applied in certain
normative practices. Of course the application of concepts in judgments is part of these
practices. In this sense, we say that linguistic expressions have a pragmatic content that is
grounded on certain normative practices. Contrary to the linguistic, structural account of
the manifest and the scientific image, the analysis of manifest and scientific practices
results  in a  more continuous picture of  the relationship between the two normative
spaces. Such a picture preserves the platitudinous intuition that science did not come out
of  nowhere.  Historically  speaking,  indeed,  there  is  a  strong  continuity  between
mechanical arts and the methods of scientific research: scientific practice is commonly
seen as a refinement and amelioration of the tools and crafts of artisans.  It  is worth
noting,  however,  that  that  process  of  refinement  does  not  simply  come  down  to  a
technical  improvement  of  the instruments  that  come to be adopted in the scientific
practice. The relevant point is rather that, by being inserted into a new context, i.e., the
laboratory, the tools and crafts of artisans undergo a process of recharacterization that
goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  elaboration  of  new  standards  and  new  ends  that  rule
scientific practice. Dewey depicted the relation between the two kinds of practices as a
shift  from  empirical  experience  to  experimental  experience.2 Consequently,  our
insistence on the continuity between manifest and scientific practices does not flatten the
differences that exist between the two; rather, it places them in a historical and material
continuum that makes it possible to tell a story about the genesis of the scientific image
from the manifest image. This is similar to what Dewey had in mind when sketching a
natural history of logical thinking. We believe that the adoption of a perspective of this
sort enhances the explanatory power of our account.
4 As  is  well  known,  in recent  years  much  has  been  written  on  the  “language  versus
experience”  debate.3 Scholars  more  inclined  towards  classical  pragmatism  have
privileged the latter over the former, while contemporary pragmatists have stuck to the
linguistic turn, and have suggested jettisoning the concept of experience because it lacks
clarity. However, as Mark Johnson has correctly remarked, it is obvious that “any strong
contrast between experience and language is just one more big dichotomy” (Johnson 2014:
14);  consequently,  this  way  of  framing  the  issue  is  unwarranted  from  a  pragmatist
perspective. Our account is in accord with Johnson’s line of reasoning, and in doing so it
aims to preserve the best of both approaches: if asked whether we privilege language over
practice (we take “practice” as synonymous with “experience”), or viceversa, our answer
would be “Both!” We take language and practice to be two aspects of a broader and
encompassing  whole,  namely  a  normative  space  like  the  scientific  and  the  manifest
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image. Mimicking Kant, it may therefore be said that, within the scientific or the manifest
image, language without practice is empty, whereas practice without language is blind.4 
5 The three main sections that make up the present article will be devoted to investigating
the different relationships that hold between science and common sense. In the next
section we will introduce the topic by presenting Sellars’ well-known distinction between
the manifest  and the scientific  image.  Sellars’  analysis  is  by far  the most  influential
account  of  the  relationship  between  science  and  common  sense.  We  rely  on  his
distinction to develop our own analytical tools, which we will use to clarify the kind of
relation between science and common sense that interest us. First, we take this relation
into account at the level of language. Then in section 3, that same relation is investigated
at the level of practices. Our goal is to articulate the pragmatist insight that the ability to
apply conceptual contents is grounded on normative practices. Finally in section 4, we
utilize  Brandom’s  meaning-use  analysis  to  systematize  the  complex  net  of  relations
between science and common sense highlighted in the two previous sections.
 
2. Ways of Representing the World
6 An iconic picture of the complex interrelation between science and common sense was
drawn by Wilfrid Sellars in his now classic Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man (1962),
where he introduced the distinction between the scientific image and the manifest image.
Both images are ideal types in which complete representations of the world are provided.
In the manifest image the world is commonsensically represented “as we encounter it in
perception and self-awareness” (Sellars 1962: 14); objects have intrinsic properties that
determine their behavior. The way in which Sellars characterizes the ontology of the
manifest image is quite interesting: he argues that its primary objects can be thought of
in terms of the category of person. He suggests that the manifest image can be described
as the categorial refinement of an original, mythical image in which all objects are in fact
treated  as  real  persons  and  all  events  are  explained  as  intentional  actions.  So,  for
instance, in order to explain why the wind took off the hut one could answer “because it
is angry at us,” or “because it intended to push clouds away and it didn’t notice us.” The
categories of the manifest image would then derive from such original image through a
process “of a gradual pruning of the implications of saying with respect to what we would
call an inanimate object, that it did something” (Sellars 1962: 12): in the manifest image,
objects do not have intentions and do not act, but their behavior is still explained in
terms of their character or nature. In other words, in the manifest image the correlations
between properties  and events  that  explain the behavior  of  things  in  the world  are
thought of in terms of the powers and dispositions of person-like objects. In order to
exemplify what he has in mind, Sellars often refers to Aristotle’s theory of being and
substance (Sellars 1975: I.29): the nature of a substance can be thought of as its form or
essence.  In  a  sense,  the  manifest  image  is  clearly  characteristic  of  common  sense.5
Nonetheless,  the  manifest  image  is  quite “scientifically  sophisticated”  as  far  as  its
empirical and conceptual resources are concerned. So, for instance, Sellars includes in the
manifest image complex inductive methods such as statistical inference, which can be
used  to  investigate  correlations  between  properties  of  things  in  the  world.  What
definitionally distinguishes the manifest from the scientific image, for Sellars, is the fact
that only in the latter we are allowed to use postulational methods: while explanations in
the manifest image purely correlate manifest properties of manifest objects, explanations
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in the scientific image involve “the postulation of imperceptible entities” (Sellars 1962: 7).
In  order  to  highlight  this  distinction,  Sellars  suggests  thinking  about  the  difference
between two kinds of explanation for the fact that a balloon has expanded, the one in
terms of the Boyle-Charles law for an ideal gas, the other in terms of the kinetic theory of
gases  (Sellars  1956:  150).  The  first  one  establishes  a  correlation  between  manifest
properties of gases: if the temperature remains constant, the pressure exerted by the
mass  of  the  gas  is inversely  proportional  to  its  volume.  The  second  one  postulates
imperceptible  particles,  atoms  and  molecules,  which  the  gas  consists  of,  so  that  the
properties of the latter can be accounted for in terms of the behavior of these particles as
defined by the kinetic laws that govern their motion: pressure consists  of  the particle
hitting the surface of the container of the gas, so – as long as the kinetic energy of the
particle is held constant – if the volume of the container is smaller, then the frequency
with which the particles hit its surface is higher. Notice that the kind of explanation
provided in the scientific image strips away the ontology of the manifest image: as Sellars
points out, “it is because a gas is – in some sense of ‘is’ – a cloud of molecules which are
behaving in certain theoretically defined ways, that it obeys the empirical Boyle-Charles
law” (Sellars 1961: 121).
7 A few remarks are necessary at this point, in order to explain how we intend to build on
these Sellarsian materials. There are two aspects of Sellars’ account that, at least for our
purposes, need further elaboration. First, we accept the distinction between the manifest
and the scientific image in terms of the notion of postulation, but we believe that it
requires some qualification because Sellars never really gives an explicit analysis of it.
Second, the distinction between the two images was originally introduced by Sellars in
relation to the problem of discussing the clash between the manifest concept of man as a
rational  subject  of  intentional  states  and  the  (at  the  time  mainly  non-cognitivist)
scientific  concept  of  man  as  a  complex  system  of  physical,  physiological  and
neurophysiological states. In this sense both the manifest and the scientific image are
thought by Sellars as images of man-in-the-world. The fortune of the Sellarsian distinction,
however, corresponds to a somewhat more liberal use of it: the two images have been
taken as images of the world. Following such a use, we will exploit the distinction between
the two ideal types of the manifest and the scientific image as a technical tool for the
investigation of the more general frameworks of science and common sense. In order to
do so, we introduce the labels MI and SI to designate these two technical notions – the
normative spaces of the manifest and the scientific image respectively.
8 Since our use of the notions of MI and SI does not coincide with Sellars’ original one we
should say a few more words about it. In the first place, it is worth emphasizing that by
MI and SI we refer to normative spaces. A normative space determines the conditions for
concept  application,  in  the sense that  the way in  which conceptual  contents  can be
articulated and ultimately determined depends on the structure of a normative space. A
collection  of  concepts that  can  be  coherently  applied  together  forms  a  conceptual
repertoire.  Therefore,  a  conceptual  repertoire  is  not  a  normative  space;  rather,  a
conceptual repertoire is possible only within a normative space, and the same normative
space can accommodate different conceptual repertoires. Similarly, a normative space
must be carefully distinguished from the representation of things in the world that can be
provided in terms of a conceptual repertoire. 
9 In the second place, it is equally important to remark that, even if we utilize the notions
of MI and SI to discuss the relations between common sense and science, MI does not
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entirely coincide with common sense, nor does SI entirely coincide with science. Both MI
and SI  stem from a  theoretical  refinement  of  some  elements of  the  two  frameworks.
Science, for instance, is much more complicated than SI. Actual, concrete science is not
merely postulational:  part  of  the scientific  activity in effect  consists  of  searching for
empirical correlations, and thus it belongs to MI. Moreover, the sociology of science has
shown how many external factors take part in the process of constitution of scientific
objectivity (Latour & Woolgar 1979). As a consequence of the practical turn in philosophy
of science, we can no longer conceive of all those factors as something merely external to
scientific  activity,  a  kind  of  scaffolding  that  supports  scientific  research  without
interfering with it.  The same holds true for the distinction between MI and common
sense. To give only an example, the latter has a moral and aesthetic dimension which is
completely lacking in MI. 
10 At this point, however, a possible objection should be addressed. One might wonder why
we choose to focus on these normative spaces if our purpose is to discuss the relation
between science and common sense. The answer is methodological and theoretical at the
same  time.  It  is  sensible  for  anyone  preparing  for  an  investigation  in  this  area  to
acknowledge that science and common sense are both heavily overloaded categories:
they are deployed in so many diverse fields and characterized in so many different ways
that it is almost impossible to simply call them up without engendering anything but
confusion. Thus, our dealing with MI and SI is expedient to mark off more precisely the
topic  of  our  analysis:  such topic  is  the  comparison between the  pragmatic  content of
science and common sense. We employ the notion of ‘pragmatic content’ to refer to the
fact that linguistic contents are grounded on normative practices.6 In fact, we believe that
our characterization of MI and SI highlights just a few of the distinctive features that are
essential to the more general frameworks of common sense and science respectively. 
11 All this being said, we must now finally clarify the postulational nature of SI. Following
Sellars,  we  define  the  distinction  between  MI  and  SI  in  terms  of  the  postulational
explanatory methods that are allowed in the latter but not in the former. The activity
that  is  distinctive of  MI  is  the search for  empirical  correlations.  On the contrary,  SI
revolves around the act of postulating entities to explain why MI objects are subjected to
those MI correlations. According to this characterization, any explanation that is based
on a framework of postulated entities presents itself as a candidate for SI.7 It is worth
noting, however, that the relevant qualification is not much sheer postulation, but rather
the construction of an explanatory framework in which the postulated entities account
for the behavior of MI objects without recourse to their powers and dispositions.
12 It may be useful here to distinguish between two different forms of postulation: ‘spurious’
and ‘genuine’ postulation. So, for instance, one could try to explain why opium makes one
sleep by postulating a virtus dormitiva. This is clearly an instance of spurious postulation.
Indeed, the postulation of the opium’s sleeping power does not qualify as a scientific
explanation in SI. Notoriously, the problem with the virtus dormitiva is that it has no real
explanatory power. Notice however that there are examples of spurious postulation that
in effect  provide satisfactory explanations,  even if  they do not qualify for SI.  So,  for
instance, a person’s behavior can be explained by postulating traits of her character: if
you ask me, “Why did John yell at me?,” I could answer “Because he has an irascible
character and you provoked him.” In doing so, I postulate a new entity, a character trait,
that accounts for an MI behavior. These sorts of postulation typically introduce other
layers of correlational explanations; so, in the case in point, the postulation of irascibility
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explains John’s yelling because irascible characters regularly produce violent reactions if
provoked. The explanation may be considered a good one because that character trait
supports different correlations. While the postulation of a virtus dormitiva only allows us
to predict that opium makes one sleep in every situation, the postulation of character
traits allows to predict different behaviors in different contexts: e.g. irascible people yell
at friends if provoked, are assertive if contradicted, smash things if they do not work as
they expect, and so on. However, since the only explanation that this kind of postulation
provides is of the correlational sort, it squarely belongs to MI. This is the reason why we
call them spurious.
13 SI postulated entities, instead, are explanatory in a genuine sense. They are theoretically
autonomous from MI objects in that they are subject to a different kind of normativity:
they obey only statistical laws rather than dispositional regularities. Consequently, they
do not go proxy for dispositions of MI objects. In other words, SI postulated entities are
autonomous because they are not constituted according to the category of person, which
is  the  fundamental  category  of  MI.  The  determination  of  a  new normative  space  is
integral to the genuine postulation of the SI entities. When an entity is postulated, the
normative  space  within  which  the  postulated  entity  is  defined  is  concomitantly
established and constituted. “Concomitantly” here should be taken in a logical rather
than temporal sense: postulated entities and the normative spaces to which they belong
are intrinsically and essentially related. The explanatory power of those entities depends
on their belonging to a normative space constituted by specific rules and principles. A
normative space allows us to draw inferences that articulate the content of the sentences
where reference to postulated entities occurs, thus providing a pattern of explanation
which,  in turn,  ultimately accounts for the behavior of  MI objects.  The intrinsic and
essential relation between postulated entities and their underlying normative space is a
pivotal feature of our account of postulation. 
14 It is important to stress that the distinction between spurious and genuine postulation
does not correspond to the distinction between the postulation of ostensible and real
entities. It might be argued that the difference between the two should come down to the
fact that genuinely postulated entities are real if the corresponding theory is true, while
spuriously postulated entities are merely fictional. This reading of the distinction is based
on an assumption that we reject, for a twofold reason. That assumption is the idea that
the qualifications ‘genuine’ and ‘spurious’ have to do with truth. Firstly, it is not correct
to say that spuriously postulated entities are not real: actually, they are real within MI, if
the corresponding theory is true, since they are adequately constructed according to the
fundamental category of that normative space, namely the category of person. Secondly,
the postulation of entities may be genuine even in the case in which the corresponding
theory is false.  Such a distinction is therefore preliminary and independent from the
empirical investigation about the reality of postulated entities. To say that entities are
genuinely postulated is noncommittal  with respect to the adoption of a realist  or an
instrumentalist stance towards them.
15 It is important to see clearly why the normative space of SI genuinely postulated entities
cannot be integrated within the normative space of MI. As we have already pointed out,
we rely on Sellars’ insight that the basic ontological category of MI can be characterized
in terms of the concept of person, and the normativity of the correlations that articulate
its  explanatory  framework  in  terms  of  the  powers  and  dispositions  of  person-like
substances.  So  consider,  for  instance,  the  MI  statement  “Light  bulbs  light  up  when
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crossed  by  electric  current.”  This  commonsensical  principle  expresses  a  correlation
between  some  manifest  properties  of  certain  substances,  where  the  correlation
essentially depends on their form. So, in our example, a light bulb is a substance that has
the potentiality to light up when acted upon by another substance, the electric current (a
spuriously postulated entity). SI statements, instead, do not primarily ascribe properties
to substances. In a general sense, to define a scientific theory is to define a collection of
laws. Such a definition is possible only within a normative space articulated in terms of
inferential relations.8 Obviously, a collection of laws may or may not have models. The
objects of a scientific theory are the entities in the domain of the structures that satisfy it.
Satisfaction here is, of course, a semantic notion rather than an empirical one. In this
sense, the objects of a scientific theory essentially belong to the normative space of the
theory itself and do not have any essence independent of it. Accordingly, they just cannot
be  integrated  in  the  normative  space  of  MI.  The  question  whether  or  not  the  new
postulated entities exist is of course an ontological one. Now, both the manifest and the
scientific image are intended to accommodate complete representations of the world in
the sense that, ideally, they should both provide the resources to give an explanation of
the same events.  Therefore,  since they have different ontologies,  the two images are
incompatible. It is important to notice, however, that while such an incompatibility more
strikingly comes to light as a clash between different sorts of ontologies when models for
manifest  and  scientific  theories  are  considered,  nonetheless  it  lies  primarily  in  the
structure of the manifest and the scientific normative space. In our view, ontological
issues are traced back to normative ones.
16 Up to this point, we have taken into account the logical structure of postulation from the
point of view of the inferences that the act of postulation allows us to make. In doing so,
we have been concerned with the language of SI and MI, since inferences are relations
between sentences or propositions. From a pragmatist point of view, however, it is not
enough to investigate the distinctive features of the final result or outcome of a certain
act; it is also necessary to state the problems that such act is expected to tackle. In this
sense, it is important not only to understand what postulation consists of and what its
consequences are, but also why one should avail oneself of it. As may be expected, the
answer is that postulation is required when correlational explanation is not enough to
provide  a  satisfactory  account  of  why  something  is  the  case.  In  Peircean  terms,
postulation  is  a  necessity  of  inquiry  when  doubt  cannot  be  appeased  by  purely
correlational means. The source of doubt can take different forms. One might bump into a
contradictory situation, just like when the result of an experiment contradicts a law. Or
one might simply wonder how something really works, as when the reasons why a certain
law is valid are investigated. Often, it is a bit of both. Consider again, for instance, the
Boyle-Charles  law.  It  was  originally  proved  by  Boyle  in  the  17th  century  on  purely
empirical evidence by correlating variations of volume and pressure in gases at a fixed
temperature. The law, in effect, is valid only for ideal gases, but the fact that the behavior
of real gases diverts from it can be appreciated only when the law is tested at particularly
low temperature or high pressure. Such results were not originally available to Boyle and
yet, once they became apparent, they obviously required a different explanation. Such an
explanation was in fact provided in 1738 by Bernoulli, who first defined the basis of the
kinetic theory of gases by postulating that gases are composed by imperceptible particles,
whose motion determines their macroscopic properties and behavior. Quite interestingly,
Bernoulli’s approach was completely adopted only a century later, when physicists gained
clarity about the relation between heat and kinetic energy.
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3. Ways of Practicing the World
3.1. An Elucidation of Pragmatic Content 
17 The distinction between MI and SI was introduced in the previous section as a tool for the
analysis  of  the relations between common sense and science.  Such a  distinction was
defined in terms of the sort of explanation that is available in the two images: while MI
only  relies  on  correlational  methods,  the  distinctive  feature  of  SI  is  the  genuine
postulation of entities in order to account for the reason why macroscopic objects behave
like they do. Such a distinction, however, was not primarily displayed on an ontological
frame. The two images were in fact characterized as normative spaces where conceptual
repertoires can be developed to represent how things are in the world. It was also claimed
that  conceptual  repertoires  are  determined  by  the  inferential  articulation  of  these
normative spaces rather than by the models that satisfy them.
18 This approach apparently poses a series of semantic problems. First, how can conceptual
contents  be  defined  in  terms  of  inferentially  articulated  norms  only?  Second,  even
assuming that such a definition were available, how can conceptual repertoires that are
not model-theoretically defined be endowed with representational content? We believe
that, for our purposes, both questions find a satisfactory answer in a pragmatist reading
of normative inferentialism (Brandom 1994, 2000, 2008).9 
19 According  to  normative  inferentialism,  our  social  practices  as  human  beings  are
characteristically bound by norms. The correctness of what we do or not do is subject to
the independent valuation of our social peers. As social practitioners, we are provided
with  normative  statuses  that  specify  what  we  are  allowed  to  do  and  what  we  are
committed to doing. This normative social environment that we inhabit is responsible for
the  sort  of  cultural  learning  that,  together  with  the  biological  endowment  that  we
inherited through evolution,  accounts  for  our  multifarious  abilities  to  cope with the
world (see also Dewey 1938; Margolis 2016, in particular Chapter 1). Concept application
is  one  such  ability  that  allows  us  to  track  things  in  the  world,  acquire  and  modify
information  about  them,  predict  their  behavior,  and  so  on.  The  practices  involving
concept applications are governed by social norms as much as any other. In this sense,
what  distinguishes  my ability  to  make  observational  judgments  about  colors  from a
trained  parrot’s  reliable  disposition  to  croak  “that’s  red”  when confronted  with  red
surfaces is that I can handle the normative premises and consequences of my judgment:
e.g. that I am not entitled to apply the concept red in a dark room feebly illuminated by a
candle as I  apply it  in daylight,  that I  am committed to apply the concept colored to
anything to which I have applied the concept red, and so on. As it is easy to see, this is but
a pragmatist presentation of Wilfrid Sellars’ seminal notion of the space of reasons, “of
justifying and being able to justify what one says” (Sellars 1956: 169). In this context,
justification is not a merely linguistic affair, but is to be construed as the vindication of
the entitlement to the commitments that one has endorsed.
20 It is also easy to see, at this point, how the normative articulation of the practices that
involve concept application determines conceptual contents.  In fact,  the content of a
specific concept can be functionally defined in terms of the normative relations that are
practically established between its applications and the applications of other concepts.
When the expressive resources  of  logical  vocabularies  are  available,  these normative
On The Pragmatic Content of Science and Common Sense
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
8
relations can also be made explicit in terms of inferential relations between sentences.
Hence, an inferentialist semantic analysis can be introduced: the content of a sentence is
determined according to its inferential role as the couple made of the set of the sets of
premises from which it can be inferred and the set of the sets of consequences that can be
inferred from it together with other sets of sentences.10
21 This  should  be  enough to  envision  how an  answer  can be  given  to  the  first  of  the
questions considered above. In fact, conceptual contents can be functionally determined
in terms of the web of normative relations that govern them. A semantic definition of this
sort,  however,  is  not  representational.11 It  might  still  not  be  clear,  then,  how  the
judgments in which conceptual contents thus defined are applied can be about things in
the world; it is therefore worth saying a few words about this point. To begin with, the
reason why this seems to be an easy hurdle to clear for a representationalist semantics is
that  such  a  semantics  is  based  on  the  view  that  to  be  meaningful  is  just  to  have
representational content. However, representationalist semantics obtains this result at
the cost of taking for granted the notion of representation. In other words, it guarantees
that expressions have representational contents, but, in fact, it does not really explain
what  it  is  for  an  expression to  represent  something in  the  world.  In  our  approach,
conceptual contents are defined in terms of the normative relations that are established
in a practice. In this sense it is a decisively anti-representationalist approach.12 
22 There is, however, another sense in which our approach is entirely compatible with the
idea that sentences have representational content. To begin with, we obviously agree that
collections of laws expressed in the language of a theory may have models,  and that
models can play the role of semantic representations for the conceptual contents defined
by the laws. We merely contend that it is normative practices rather than the existence of
models that make a theory meaningful.  We also do not deny that the objects in the
domain of the models of a theory might be said to really exist, on the basis of a Quinean
metaontology. We simply do not think that the ontology of the language of theories is the
proper framework in which to approach the problem of the objectivity of a conceptual
repertoire developed within a normative space. Instead, we believe that normative spaces
and the real world make contact through ‘thick’ normative practices. By the expression
‘make contact’ we refer to the fact that the language of theories spins in the void – it
cannot  grasp  the  world  conceptually  –  if  it  is  not  intrinsically  related  to,  and
supplemented by,  normative  practices  in  which we are  directly  confronted with the
world.  Such  direct  confrontation  typically  takes  the  form  of  physical  manipulation,
instrumental  interference,  and so on.  We label  ‘thick’  those practices that essentially
involve a concrete,  manipulative transaction with things in the world.13 It  is  easy to
realize how this is the case for MI practices. Accordingly, we proceed to show that the
same holds for SI practices.
 
3.2. A Grammar of Scientific Practices
23 Hasok Chang has done a large amount of preliminary work in the way of highlighting
what  he  calls  the  grammar  of  scientific  practice.  In  a  series  of  articles  devoted  to
assessing the recent practical turn in philosophy of science, Chang has claimed that the
traditional practicalist approach aimed at singling out the various, different elements –
i.e.  the  various,  different  syntactic  operations,  as  well  as  the  laboratory’s  material
equipment – that enter into experimental practice should be integrated with an analysis
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of the ways in which they concretely combine and interact with each other (Chang 2011,
2014). We cannot rest satisfied with a taxonomy of experimental practice put in linguistic
terms, he argues; what we need to know is the life of those elements. The structure of
such life is what Chang refers to with the label ‘grammar of practice,’ which consists in
the possible ways – ‘possible’ here is not intended in a strictly logical sense, but rather in
a material and functional sense, like when one lists the possible ways of building a house
or  cultivating  a  cornfield  –  in  which  a  complex  group  of  epistemic  activities  may
consistently work. We take the idea of groups of epistemic activities to be synonymous
with our notion of SI practices.
24 Chang’s goal is similar to ours; he also aims to avoid the disconnection between science
and its practice. The kind of disconnection that Chang has in mind is the by-product of
the habit of focusing on the results of scientific investigation rather than on the processes
that  yield  them,  with  that  habit  representing  the  standard  view  among  analytic
philosophers  of  science.  According  to  this  view,  scientific  theories  are  bodies  of
propositions, and philosophical problems about them can be assessed by investigating the
logical relationships between those propositions. Therefore, the role of SI practices in
bringing about SI languages is almost completely neglected: as a consequence of that
move, the concrete life of science is substituted with a logical or mathematical analysis of
the relations holding between the elements of the theories – whether conceived of in
terms of linguistic propositions or set-theoretic structures.
25 It is very interesting that, as a possible way of defusing the threat of disconnection, Chang
suggests shifting the attention from nouns to verbs. So, for instance, take ‘representation’
and think of it as ‘representing,’ take ‘causality’ and think of it as ‘causing,’ and so on. In
doing so,  the active character of scientific knowledge is brought under the spotlight.
While  ‘representation’  seems  to  entail  a  sort  of  simple,  direct  relation  to  the  thing
represented, ‘representing’ implies a more complex network of relations, centered on the
role and function of the epistemic agent engaged in the activity of representing a state of
affairs for a specific purpose in a specific context. This move sounds very Deweyan in
spirit. It was Dewey who firstly suggested to treat adjectives and nouns as adverbs: let’s
not talk of intelligence or rationality, but rather of an intelligently conducted activity;
let’s not talk of a true belief, but rather of a truly reconstructed situation.14 Thanks to that
shift of perspective, the issue can be framed in a radically different manner, and new
questions  emerge  and  wait  to  be  answered.  Those  questions  concern  the  epistemic
activity of the knowing subject: “who is doing what, why, how, and in what context?”
26 Nonetheless, focusing on verbs (or adverbs) rather than on nouns (or adjectives) is not
enough to grasp the concrete reality of the practices that comprise scientific activity: the
point is that, by talking of representing instead of representation, we remain on a purely
linguistic level. At best, we succeed in providing an extremely ethereal account of the
epistemic activities involved in SI practices, grounded on the triviality that to speak is to
act. An account of this kind could be labeled ‘pragmatist’ only in a minimal and wholly
uninteresting sense. Consequently, a further step should be taken, which brings to the
fore the concrete set of epistemic activities associated with a certain verb. 
27 We are brought back to the idea of the thickness of SI practices. In a functionalist and
pragmatist  fashion,  Chang states  that  “all  scientific  work,  including  pure  theorizing,
consists of actions – physical, mental, and ‘paper-and-pencil’ operations” (Chang 2011:
208).  This is  a genuinely pragmatist  move in that it  draws attention on the material
conditions of possibility of SI sentences. The production of SI sentences is part of the SI
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practices in which the agent is engaged. On the one hand, SI sentences are proffered at a
certain moment, for a specific purpose. Usually, they are proffered with an eye to the
consequences that can be brought about by their utterances – i.e. to record an event, to
describe a particular phenomenon, to establish an experimental setting, and so on. On the
other  hand,  the  utterances  of  SI  sentences  are  checked and controlled by the  other
operations  with  which  they  continuously  interact.  It  is  for  this  very  reason  that  a
taxonomy of the elements of the scientific practice is not enough to understand what
scientific activity is. Without a normative framework in which operations are performed
and interact with each other, providing a list of the elements that compose a scientific
practice is  not explanatory at  all.  It  is  like listing the elements in a toolbox without
providing  any  information  about  their  function  and  forms  of  employment;  such
knowledge would be blatantly insufficient. Coherent sets of epistemic activities are the
overall  normative  context  in  which  operations  are  performed  and  can  exert  their
functions. For a set of epistemic activities to be coherent, it has to be directed towards a
certain end – paradigmatically, the acquisition of a certain bit of knowledge or, to put it
in pragmatist terms, the solution of a specific problematic situation – in accordance with
some set of discernible rules.15 As Chang remarks, “[b]ecause activities are rule-bound
systems of actions, they are inherently normative in the sense that the actions within an
activity are continually evaluated in terms of their conformity to the rules” (Chang 2011:
209). 
28 We agree with Chang on all these points, but we are ready to take a step further. The
point we would like to stress is that the insistence on the complex nature of SI practices
paves the way for a globally consistent anti-representationalist account of the semantic
content  of  scientific  concepts.  The  difference  between  our  two  approaches  can  be
highlighted  by  an  example.  Speaking  of  how  the  nature  of  a  definition  should  be
conceived once we take a practical turn, Chang says:
[I]nstead of thinking about the nature of a definition, we can consider what one has
to do in defining a scientific term: formulate formal conditions, construct physical
instruments and procedures for measurement, round people up on a committee to
monitor the agreed uses of the concept, and devise methods to punish people who
do not adhere to the agreed uses. (Chang 2011: 208)
29 In our view, this set of epistemic activities establishes the normative rules for the use of
an SI concept. We are concerned with the conditions of possibility of SI definitions, and
we trace  them back to  the SI  practices  that  are  necessary to  master  the  use  of  the
concept. In more general terms, we hold that the complex set of syntactic operations,
practical skills needed to carry out scientific experiments in a laboratory context, and
‘institutional capabilities’ that make it possible for a researcher to be part of a community
(scientific, technological and democratic) is all that is necessary to use an SI concept. So,
for instance, to fully master the SI concept of atom one must (1) handle in a competent
manner the mathematical and syntactical tools necessary to formulate the best atomic
theory available; (2) master the laboratory equipment required to detect or modify the
behavior of  atoms;  (3)  be aware of  the rules governing the different communities to
which she belongs as a scientist, as a citizen, as a possible patent holder, etc.16 
30 A qualification here is needed: we have said that to fully master an SI concept one must
display three different kinds of capacities. It is important to properly understand what is
conveyed by the adverb ‘fully.’ ‘Fully’ here does not mean completely: that would amount
to a too restrictive clause. It would entail that, in order to use in a normatively adequate
way  the  concept  of  atom  (and  the  corresponding  linguistic  expression),  one  should
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possess perfectly developed capacities in many different fields.  If  that were the case,
nobody could be said to master the SI concept of atom, which is an undesired skeptical
result.  What  we  have  in  mind  here  is  something  like  Collins  and  Evans’  distinction
between contributory and interactional experts. In their book Rethinking Expertise, Collins
and Evans stress the difference between contributory expertise, which is required to do
an activity with competence, and interactional expertise, which is “the ability to master
the language of a specialist domain in the absence of practical competence” (Collins &
Evans 2007: 14). Similarly, we argue that it is possible to master some parts of the SI
language without  fully  mastering them,  that  is,  without  mastering the practices  that
establish the normative conditions for the use of SI concepts. The ‘interactional’ use of SI
language,  so  to  say,  is  therefore parasitic  to  the ‘contributory’  use  consisting in  the
mastery of SI practices.
31 Before  moving  on  to  the  next  section,  where  a  comprehensive  account  of  the
relationships between MI and SI is provided, we would like to address an issue which has
been left untouched until now. In section 2 we have acknowledged the introduction of
postulated entities for explanatory reasons as the distinctive feature of the SI normative
space. In that context, we have argued that the distinction between MI and SI normative
spaces  consists  precisely  of  the  fact  that  SI  language  allows  and  supports  genuine
postulational  activity,  a  postulational  activity  being  genuine  when  the  entities  it
introduces are not conceived in terms of the categories of MI. What remains to be done is
therefore to highlight how such a postulational activity shows up at the level of practices,
thus marking a difference between SI and MI practices. 
32 We should be careful,  however,  not  to  overemphasize the elements  of  discontinuity.
Because of the very structure of a practice, the clear-cut differences that can be easily
detected at the linguistic level are inevitably blurred at the level of practices. In the last
analysis, every practice, no matter how complicated and abstract it might be, comes down
to a manipulation – both physical and symbolic – of natural objects, events and worldly
states of affairs. SI practices are particularly complex because they are made of extremely
refined epistemic activities, such as testing, constructing models, measuring, calculating,
writing,  classifying,  and  so  on;  however,  they  are  not  essentially different  from  MI
practices.  Ultimately,  SI  practices  are  human  activities  which  stem  from  the
technological, formal and normative refinement of the artifactual, linguistic and social
resources of common sense. The difference between MI and SI practices is therefore, in a
sense, a matter of degree: SI practices can be (and indeed have been) elaborated from MI
practices. Clearly, the recognition of a certain continuity does not imply the thesis that
there is no difference between them; there is, as everybody who ever took part to the
activity of  a  scientific  laboratory knows perfectly well!  We do not  want to deny the
differences between MI and SI practices; our point is simply that the clear discontinuity
that exists between SI and MI languages cannot be found among MI and SI practices.
33 With this in mind, we go back to the issue concerning the form taken by postulational
activity in SI practices. Our solution is inspired by Hacking’s experimental conception of
effects or phenomena. In Representing and Intervening Hacking remarks that phenomena
should be conceived of  as  regularities  which are consequences of  the laws of  nature
formulated  in  our  theories.  Contrary  to  the  philosophical  sense  of  the  word
‘phenomenon,’  Hacking  does  not  use  it  to  refer  to  something  private,  but  rather  to
“something public, regular, possibly law-like, but perhaps exceptional” (Hacking 1983:
222). When a phenomenon is particularly interesting and instructive, scientists call it an
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effect. Consequently, a phenomenon is the result of an experimental SI activity that alters
more or less dramatically the course of nature, thus creating a regularity that would be
otherwise inaccessible through MI practices.
34 What is relevant to note is that, according to Hacking, effects do not exist “outside of
certain kinds of apparatus.” “In nature,” he argues, “there is just complexity, which we
are  remarkably  able  to  analyse.  We do so  by  distinguishing,  in  the  mind,  numerous
different  laws.  We  also  do  so,  by  presenting,  in  the  laboratory,  pure,  isolated,
phenomena” (Hacking 1983: 226). What ‘exists’ (holds) independently of our experimental
SI practices are the laws of nature; on the contrary, effects and phenomena do not exist
until  an  experimenter  discovers  how to  disentangle  a  particular  arrangement  which
exemplifies – rather than merely instantiates17 – a particular effect or phenomenon by
purifying it from other intervening and interfering causes.
35 Following up on Hacking’s  insight,  we argue that  an interesting way to think of  the
postulational activity at the level of SI practices is in terms of Cartwright’s ‘nomological
machines,’18 i.e.,  in terms of the construction of experimental settings which make it
possible to produce effects or phenomena in a laboratory context. Such a comparison is
warranted by the fact that the construction of an experimental setting is a kind of activity
which is structurally similar to the act of postulation, since in the former a modification
of some natural conditions is produced in order to account for correlations that would be
left otherwise unexplained. In both cases, the search for correlations is supplemented by
the introduction of some factors that dramatically enhance the explanatory power of
scientific activity – nomological  machines at  the level  of  SI  practices,  and postulated
entities at the level of SI languages. There are two more similarities that are worthy of
note. First of all, the construction of an experimental setting cannot be severed from the
theory that allows the particular, specific regularity exemplified by that arrangement.
Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that they share the same structural complexity.
Secondly, both the postulated entities and the nomological machines do not exist or hold
outside of  a well-defined context,  respectively the SI  language of  the theory and the
laboratory SI practices.19 
 
4. Meaning-Use Analysis
36 In sections 2 and 3 we have analyzed the languages and the practices of  science and
common sense as they come into view in MI and SI. We have also discussed the pragmatic
significance of the conceptual contents that are expressed in these languages and we
have maintained that practices are fundamental to their determination. In fact, the way
in which normative spaces have been presented prefigures an analysis of languages and
practices as deeply intertwined. In this section we will try to offer a sharper picture of the
relations between the various components of MI and SI.  In order to do that,  we will
exploit the expressive resources of Brandom’s so called “meaning-use analysis,” which is
essentially a collection of theoretical tools designed to provide a pragmatist analysis of
languages and their semantic contents (Brandom 2008). 
37 Our purpose is to argue that in a normative inferentialist approach, like the one we have
endorsed here, the traditional ontological conflict between science and common sense is
shifted from the level of the semantic analysis of languages to the level of the analysis of
normative  practices.  One  of  the  most  efficacious  illustrations  of  such  a  conflict  is
Eddington’s  example  of  the  two  tables.  Eddington  suggested  that  if  the  ontological
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commitments of  science and common sense are taken at face value,  then it  must be
acknowledged that for every common sense object there exists a scientific duplicate that
is distinct from it. Consider a table, for instance. On the one hand there is the table of
common sense,  an MI object  with phenomenological  properties  like extension,  color,
shape, impenetrability, weight, etc. On the other hand there is the table of science, a
mostly empty space in which many electric charges move around. Whereas the MI table is
a  substance  with  properties,  the  SI  table  is  hardly  something  at  all.  There  is  an
unquestionable ontological distinction between the two tables. The problem arises when
the representational content of our assertions about tables is taken into account: when
we talk about tables, do we refer to the MI or the SI one? Since we cannot refer to both, in
establishing whether our assertions are true or false should we adopt the ontology of
common sense or the ontology of science? This is what the problem is usually taken to be.
38 The most common and accredited interpretation of Eddington’s example admits that the
references to the two tables are in effect semantically incompatible, because the objects
they refer to are ontologically incompatible with each other. Once this is acknowledged,
however, one seems to be forced to choose one table or the other. So, on the one hand,
scientific realists acknowledge the existence of the SI table only and lessen the ontology
of common sense as phenomenalism. On the other hand, those who stick to the MI table –
like,  for  instance,  phenomenologists  who  vindicate  the  primacy  of  the  life-world  –
endorse an instrumentalist approach to scientific theories, according to which the latter
are nothing but tools useful to cope with the world, which can be legitimately employed
only with the proviso that they allow us to save the phenomena. Although Eddington’s
picture describes a sound ontological dilemma, we believe nonetheless that the conflict
between science and common sense cannot be settled by picking one of its horns. We
suggest,  instead,  that  a  better  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  these  two
frameworks can be achieved by opting out of the ontological plan altogether. In order to
do that, we need to investigate more in depth how the MI and SI normative spaces are
interrelated. 
39 As remarked above, the two main components that characterize a normative space are a
language and a practice.  We thus distinguish,  on the one side,  the language and the








).  Here,  L
M
 is  the language in which we talk about tables and their colors,  the
language in which we formulate the Boyle-Charles law for gases, and so on. On the other
hand, the practice P
M
 is the ordinary practice of dealing with these substances and their
properties, in the peculiar way that characterizes us as rational human beings and that
consists in having the responsibility to justify what we do. Similarly, L
S
 is the language of
science in which we talk about atoms and report gravitational waves, while P
S
 is the thick
scientific practice that we have described in the previous section.
40 The first kinds of relation that we want to single out connect languages and practices
inside the same normative space. We have argued that practices are fundamental to the
determination  of  the  conceptual  contents  expressed  in  MI  and  SI  languages.  As  a










This is a relation that Brandom calls “practice-vocabulary-sufficiency” (PV-Sufficiency),
because it holds when the condition of engaging in a certain practice is sufficient for the
meaningful deployment of a certain language. In this sense we have both that P
M
 is PV-
Sufficient with respect to L
M
 and that P
S
 is PV-Sufficient with respect to L
S
. 
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41 Another relation that Brandom considers is the inverse “vocabulary-practice-sufficiency”
(VP-Sufficiency), which holds between a certain language and a certain practice when the
language contains the expressive resources to specify what one must be able to do in
order to engage in the practice. Since both MI and SI are ideal types that contain the









.  Thus L
M








42 Let’s pause to take stock. So far we have defined VP-Sufficiency, an expressive relation
between languages and practices, and PV-Sufficiency, a semantically grounding relation
between practices  and languages.  These  few instruments  already allow us  to  ask  an
interesting question: What if a language L' is VP-Sufficient with respect to a practice P 
that in turn is PV-sufficient with respect to a language L''? This question invites to reason
about a scenario in which a language L' is expressive enough to specify a practice P, the
engaging in which is sufficient for the meaningful deployment of another language L''. In
this scenario a composite relation between the languages L' and L'' can be envisaged, one
that is mediated by the practice P. Here, in a sense, L' allows to express the contents of L'',
to the extent that it allows to specify the practice that establishes them. And yet, L' is not
a semantic metavocabulary for L'', because it does not talk about the expressions of L''.
Thus  Brandom  calls  L' a  “pragmatic  metavocabulary”  for  L''.  Notice  that  it  is  not




 are pragmatic metavocabularies of themselves. This should not be surprising: since
the languages of MI and SI in our analysis must be expressively complete, they contain
the resources to specify the practices that ground their contents.20 
43 We  can  then  proceed  to  consider  whether  there  are  relations  holding  between  the




,  however,  the
picture is not really encouraging. Eddington’s example suggests that the languages of the
two images are on the whole semantically  autonomous.  Surely,  there is  no semantic
reduction between them. So, for instance, reference to tables can be reduced to reference
to electric charges with kinetic energy only at the price of obliterating the whole MI as a
normative space. 
44 The overview however changes substantially when practices are taken into account. For it
is easy to see that the language of SI has the expressive power to specify the practices of
MI. Consider the following example. To be able to apply the MI concept of a light bulb is,
among other things, to acknowledge that flipping the light switch will turn the light bulb
on.  The  expression  ‘flipping  the  light  switch  will  turn  the  light  bulb  on’  is  a  norm
expressed in L
M
 that governs the practice of application of the concept of light bulb. Such
a norm, however, can also be specified in L
S
. In order to do that, the lighting of the light
bulb is to be represented in SI. Physicists explain that the electrons that are accelerated
by the electric field created by flipping the switch collide with the atoms of the filament
in the light bulb.  The electrons of  these excited atoms transition into higher energy
levels. Quantum electrodynamics says that atoms may spontaneously transition back to
their ground state: when they do so, electromagnetic radiation is emitted in the form of
photons. The wavelength of the emitted photons depends on the distance between the
energy levels of the atomic transition. The material and the mass of the filament inside a
light  bulb  are  such  that  the  probability  of  photons  being  emitted  in  the  visible
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wavelengths is high enough for the light bulb to glow. One can then specify what it is to
be able to apply the MI concept of a light bulb in L
S
 by saying that it involves, among
other things, acknowledging that, when the light switch is flipped, an electric field excites
the atoms of the filament in the light bulb that spontaneously emit photons in visible
wavelengths  when they  jump back  to  their  ground  state.  Notice  that  although  it  is
specified in L
S
, the practice of turning on light bulbs is not a scientific one. This example
illustrates that it is possible to say in L
S 





 can be deployed as a pragmatic metavocabulary for L
M
. So, while it is not
possible to reduce the contents of the language of MI to the contents of the language of
SI, it is still possible to use L
S
 to talk about the practices that establish the norms that
determine the contents of L
M
.
45 The  pragmatic  point  of  view  also  allows  to  see  that  there  are  interesting  relations
between P
M
 and  P
S
 too.  As  far  as  the  analysis  of  the  conflict  between MI  and  SI  is




. As was explained in the previous section, we see P
S
 as characterized by the complex
collection of epistemic activities that allow for the formulation and testing of scientific
theories. The normative space of SI only obtains when these activities are up and running
in scientific practices. However, the development of all the formal, material and social
resources  required  to  start  and  sustain  them  is  a  complex  process.  Such  a  process
consists, among other things, in defining languages and theories with new expressive
power, in constructing new instruments and equipment and learning how to use them, in
establishing new social groups and normative statuses. It is important to realize that the
development of all these heavily relies on the resources that are available in P
M
. Let us
start with the most obvious case: although experimental equipment enables SI abilities,
they are in effect macroscopic objects, so designing, constructing and operating them
requires  a  whole  series  of  MI  abilities.  Similarly,  the  ability  to  ascribe  SI  normative
statuses  to  scientific  communities  and institutions  requires  the  ability  to  ascribe  MI
normative statuses to people.  The case of  the development of  SI  formal  resources is
slightly more ponderous. We will present it by means of an example: consider the notion
of integral, which is employed to express wave functions in the definition of particles like
electrons.  Integrals do not belong to MI.  By contrast  they are part of  the expressive
resources required to engage in SI  practices.  If  we look at the history of the notion,
however, we clearly see how the development of the ability to deploy the concept of
integral  consists  in  a  progressive  elaboration  of  other  abilities  that were  previously
available  in  MI.  Leibniz,  for  instance,  thought  of  integration  as  an  infinite  sum  of
ordinates with infinitesimal abscissas.21 
46 Admittedly, these remarks are only of an introductory character, but they are enough to
outline the relation of elaboration between the practices of MI and SI that we want to




because the resources required by the
epistemic activities that characterize P
S
 can be elaborated from the resources that are
already available in P
M





clearly a species of the more general genus that Brandom calls PP-Sufficiency relations.
These hold, he explains, “when having acquired one set of abilities means one can already
do everything one needs to do, in principle, to be able to do something else” (Brandom
2008: 26). For want of a better word, we will simply refer to the sort of elaboration that we




 as PP-Sufficiency. In this case P
M
 is PP-sufficient for P
S
.
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47 In order to wrap this all up, all the relations that have been described here are depicted in
Figure 1.
 
Figure 1: meaning-use analysis
48 If we now look at the whole picture drawn by this analysis, we can see that is has several
points of strength. First of all, it acknowledges that the evident ontological clash between




are incompatible in the strong sense that the models that make L
S
 sentences true
are  not  isomorphic  to  the  models  that  make  L
M
 sentences  true.  In  a  Quinean




 talk about different things: if L
S
 sentences are
true then wave functions exist, if L
M
 sentences are true then instead tables exist. And
since SI and MI are ideally complete representations, wave functions and tables cannot




 sentences must not be really true. In our analysis, however,
while model-theoretic semantics is accepted as an essential expressive resource, it does
not play a foundational role with respect to the meaning of the expressions of a language.




 are construed as determined by the





49 Hence,  since the practices of  science and common sense are clearly intertwined,  our
analysis also allows one to account for the continuity between the two frameworks. In
particular,  it  makes  room  for  an  explanation  of  the  process  of  development  and
enrichment of common sense. Here we have sketched some of the lines along which it is
possible to investigate how a common sense practice like P
M
 can be elaborated into a
scientific one like P
S
.  At the same time, however, we have not blurred the distinction
between the practices of science and common sense. While MI can make use of methods
that  are  usually  taken  to  be  characteristic  of  scientific  activity,  like  idealization,
induction, abduction and statistical inference, SI is still distinguished, both on the level of
practices and on the level of languages, by its distinctive postulational activity.
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5. Conclusions
50 In this paper we have presented a pragmatist approach to the analysis of the relations
between science and common sense.  In particular,  we have been concerned with the
structure that can be given to a comparison between the two frameworks. Therefore, we
have focused on a specific area in which they overlap, an area that we have delimited in
terms of the notions of SI and MI and that we believe may paradigmatically highlight the
shape of their connection. As we have defined them, SI and MI are normative spaces that
are differently characterized by practically established norms. These norms functionally
determine the conceptual contents which are applied to give linguistic representations of
things in the world. Traditionally, the comparison between science and common sense
has been drawn at the level of these linguistic representations. And since these linguistic
representations are semantically incompatible, the two frameworks have been regarded
as mutually exclusive.  In our approach,  instead,  we suggest investigating the conflict
between science and common sense at the level of the practices. Thus, we give an analysis
of  SI  and  MI  practices  that  accounts  for  the  distinction  between  the  postulational
character of the former and the merely correlational norms of the latter. At the same
time,  we  show how SI  practices  can  be  elaborated  from MI  ones  and  are  therefore
continuous with them. By focusing on practices, our approach also allows us to shed a
different light on the relation between the languages of science and common sense. In
fact, we note that SI language is a pragmatic metavocabulary for MI language, in the
sense that it is possible to specify in the former what one must be able to do in order to
engage in the practice that semantically grounds the latter. 
51 Of course, all this only scratches the surface of the relationship between the practices of
science and common sense, and we think that a lot of promising work is still to be done in
this  area.22 We also believe that  the very possibility of  reorienting the focus of  such
investigation  away  from  ontological  conflicts  and  towards  their  practical  roots  is  a
relevant contribution of our pragmatist approach. Among the values of such an approach
we also count the fact that it keeps together different conflicting intuitions that all seem
to be valid. In particular it allows to acknowledge the incompatibility between conceptual
repertoires  of  science  and  common  sense,  but  it  also  allows  us  to  treat  such
incompatibility as non-malicious,  one that can be resolved by taking into account the
continuity of  practices.  Accordingly,  it  suggests  that  there is  no need to look for an
alleged fixed group of theses which are essential to MI: common sense evolves and is
permeable to the results  of  scientific  investigations.  Finally,  since it  moves from the
assumption of a continuity between science and common sense, our account may provide
some elements to explain why in the history of  science phenomenological  laws have
proved to be quite independent from the scientific explanations that were given for them.
The point is that phenomenological laws belong to common sense, being correlations
between manifest properties of manifest objects. That suggestion paves the way for a
pragmatist analysis of the relations between operational practices – such as measurement
– and SI languages, much in the spirit of Chang’s recent reappraisal of operationalism
(Chang 2004, 2012, 2017).
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NOTES
1. As will be more thoroughly explained in the body of the paper, we take the norms that define a
normative space to be expressed and articulated in terms of inferences. However, we do not take a
position on the idea that pure and simple inferential rules could make it possible to distinguish
between the normative spaces of science and common sense.
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2. The distinction between an empirical and an experimental conception of experience is drawn
by Dewey in the 1906 essay Experience and Objective Idealism.
3. For  a  recent  assessment  of  this  issue,  see  the  Symposium Language  or  Experience.  Charting
Pragmatism’s Course for 21st Century, edited by D. Hildebrand on this journal, Volume 6, Number 2,
2014.
4. This is an acceptable characterization as long as practice and language are correctly conceived.
It is important to avoid a possible misunderstanding here. We do not want to convey the idea
that practice is not linguistic, or that language is not practical. That view would fly in the face of
the overall approach adopted in the present article. Our approach is pragmatist precisely because
and insofar as it attempts to take the relation between language and practice seriously: in fact,
the very possibility of such relation – although it would be better to talk of ‘interrelation’ or
‘intrinsic relation’ – puts some normative constraints on how practice and language should be
conceived.  They  could  not  enter  into  relation  with  one  another  if  they  were  completely
dissimilar. Accordingly, every practice is linguistic through and through, otherwise it would be
epistemically irrelevant. At the same time, language is “fraught with oughts,” as Sellars put it, in
that a discursive practice is needed in order for linguistic expressions to have semantic content.
5. It’s  worth  stressing  that  the  manifest  image  is  only  one of  the  normative  spaces  in  the
framework of common sense. Some of these spaces – like e.g. religion, morals or esthetics – have
simply nothing to do with science. See below for further discussion. 
6. The  notion  of  pragmatic  content  inverts  the  relationship  between  objectivity  and
representation.  ‘Pragmatic  content’  is  therefore  the  technical  notion  on  which  our  anti-
representationalism relies. For a further discussion of our anti-representationalist approach, see
Section 3. 
7. In  the  philosophy  of  science,  the  objects  of  scientific  theories  are  usually  referred  to  as
“theoretical entities.” Throughout this paper we intentionally refrain from the use of such an
expression for two reasons. First, the notion of “theoretical” objects is too often characterized in
contrast to the notion of “observational” ones. This opposition, however, is only tangential to
our concerns: in fact, we abstain from the use of “observational” as well. Second, if the notion of
theoretical  objects  is  not  characterized  in  terms  of  this  opposition  (or  in  terms  of  other
oppositions we are not concerned with here), then it simply amounts to the notion of the object
of a theory, which is rather uninformative.
8. When we say that a normative space is required for the definition of a collection of laws we are
not committing to any substantial characterization (syntactical, semantical, structural, etc.) of
normative spaces. In other words, we do not have a metatheory of normative spaces. Rather, we
are interested in the practices that support them.
9. For an analysis of Brandom’s normative inferentialism see Turbanti 2017.
10. The seminal idea of an inferentialist semantics is usually traced back to Frege’s account of
conceptual content (“Begriffliche Inhalt”) in the Begriffsschrift (Frege 1879). The very same idea is
originally utilized by Carnap (1939) in his logical analysis of syntax. The inferentialist approach
to the analysis of the content of logical expressions has been carried out in particular in proof
theory. Such a tradition stems out of Gentzen’s work (Gentzen 1934-5) and has been developed
eminently  by  Dag  Prawitz  (see  e.g.  Prawitz  1965,  2006).  Proof-theoretic  semantics  is  a  now
ongoing  enterprise  (Francez  2015).  In  philosophy,  inferentialist  semantics  has  been  largely
investigated in particular by Dummett (1977, 1991) and by Brandom (1994, 2000, 2008). See also
Peregrin (2014) for a recent attempt to further develop the subject.
11. It may be worth clarifying that to say that conceptual contents are determined by the norms
established in practices is not to say that the content of a concept is the practice that establishes
the norms for its use. In other words, the inferentialist semantics that we are presenting is just
not  representational  at  all. In  particular,  it  does  not  deal  with  truth-makers.  However,  it  is
compatible  with  standard  representational  semantics  (provided  that  it  is  used  for  semantic
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analysis only). So, for instance, while we claim that the content of the SI concept of electron is
determined by the norms established in a certain SI practice, we also accept that the truth-maker
of a sentence in which the concept of electron is applied is not the bundle of practices that
provide the sufficient and necessary conditions for the use of the concept (nor these conditions
themselves), but, as one would rightly expect, a certain fact about electrons (or something else,
depending on one’s theoretical preferences about truth-makers).
12. It is even more so than other possible pragmatist approaches that might be considered as
opposing representationalism. The point we would like to stress in this regard is that the idea of
problem-solving is not enough to dismantle semantic representationalism. Indeed, one may hold
that knowledge is what is achieved at the end of the process of inquiry, and that inquiry is a
problem-solving  activity;  nonetheless,  this  way  of  framing the  issue  –  which  is  clearly  anti-
representionalist in the minimal sense that true and justified beliefs do not depict or represent
something given before and independently of the inquiry – does not tell anything about how the
semantic content of concepts is  established.  It  may well  be that the semantic content of the
concepts used in the process of inquiry is still defined in purely representationalist terms, even
though  the  purpose  of  their  applications  contradicts  some  of  the  main  assumptions  of
representationalism. A position of this sort would be a half-hearted anti-representationalism.
From this perspective, Dewey’s instrumentalist account of concepts counts as a full-blown form
of semantic anti-representationalism.
13. The label ‘thick’ is also used by Brandom to refer to those feedback-governed practices that
“essentially involve objects, events and worldly states of affairs” (Brandom 2008: 180; Brandom
2011: 17). In his view, these are practices that cannot be specified without also specifying what
they  refer  to:  so,  for  instance,  one  cannot  specify  what  hammering  is  without  mentioning
hammers and nails. We adopt a thoroughly pragmatist point of view, and by ‘thick practices’ we
mean those practices that involve active coping with the non-linguistic world.
14. As Dewey writes, “[t]he adverb ‘truly’ is more fundamental than either the adjective, true, or
the noun,  truth,”  and he specifies  that  the reason why the adverb is  fundamental  is  that  it
“expresses a way, a mode of acting” (Dewey 1920: 182). What Dewey wants to say is that, in order
to understand what a concept means,  we should look at the practices in which that concept
originates and is applied. Clearly, that thesis is a corollary of the pragmatic maxim.
15. The coherence at stake here is not logical consistency: it is a less technical notion, which
simply requires that the different operations cooperate towards to a realization of a final end,
loosely defined. 
16. The third point on this list may seem by far the least important: one may think that it only
concerns the socio-political and cultural context in which scientific activity is carried out, that is,
something external to the essential core of the SI practice. We disagree. Indeed, we believe that it
would  sound  very  strange  if  a  scientist  who  claims  to  be  an  expert  in  atomic  theory  were
completely ignorant of the impact of her discoveries on scientific communities, as well as of the
socio-political bearings that such discoveries may have on the life of his fellow citizens – or, at
least,  of  the  possibility  that  her  discoveries  may  have  indirect  socio-political  consequences.
Intuitively, the capacity to locate her work in the different ‘institutional’ contexts that it may
affect is part of what we mean with ‘knowing how to use the concept of atom.’
17. On the distinction between instantiate and exemplify, see (Rouse 2015: 295-6).
18. “What  is  a  nomological  machine?  It  is  a  fixed (enough)  arrangement  of  components,  or
factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of stable (enough) environment will,
with  repeated operation,  give  rise  to  the  kind of  regular  behavior  that  we represent  in  our
scientific laws.” (Cartwright 1999: 50).
19. We are well aware that these remarks only show, at best, that there are some interesting
structural similarities between nomological machines and postulational activity in SI. However,
we are not committed with a strong identity claim; we are content with the weaker hypothesis
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that  they  play  a  similar  role  in  scientific  explanation.  We  leave  the  issue  open  for  further
discussion.
20. The notion of pragmatic metavocabulary is certainly one of the most interesting results of
Brandom’s meaning-use analysis. To the contrary of what we do here, however, Brandom never
considers languages that are pragmatic metavocabularies of themselves. This is because he is
mainly interested in the different expressive power of pragmatically related languages, as e.g.









coarse-grained for his analysis. Notice that pragmatic metavocabularies do not involve paradoxes
of self reference like those pointed out by Tarski for semantic metavocabularies.
21. This latter sort of practical elaboration of expressive resources is akin to what Brandom has
in mind when he talks about the algorithmic elaboration of new abilities “where exercising the
target ability just is exercising the right basic abilities in the right order and under the right
circumstances” (Brandom 2008: 26). Of course, this is the basic idea of a computable function in
computability theory. Brandom however applies it also to expressive resources. So, for instance,
he argues that  the ability  to  deploy conditionals  can be algorithmically  elaborated from the
“primitive abilities to make assertions and to sort inferences into those that are and those that
are  not  materially  good  ones”  (Brandom  2008:  44):  in  effect,  the  conditional  “A→B” can  be
asserted if and only if the inference from A to B is sorted out as a good one.





. Scientific practice in fact may have a deep impact on the practices of common
sense through technology. We have not dwelt on technological elaboration in this paper and we
defer it to another occasion.
ABSTRACTS
In our paper we aim to update and revise the pragmatist conception of the relationship between
science and common sense. First of all,  we introduce two technical notions (MI and SI),  with
which  we  identify  the  normative  spaces  of  the  manifest  and  the  scientific  image,  and  we
highlight  the differences  between these two notions and their  Sellarsian cognates.  Secondly,
within each normative space we investigate the connections between languages and practices:
we ground linguistic contents on the normative relations that are established in the practices of
the  corresponding  normative  space.  Finally,  we  rely  on  Brandom’s  meaning-use  analysis  to
provide a representation of the different ways in which MI and SI practices and languages may
interact. Our pragmatist proposal is to trace back the ontological conflict that is usually believed
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